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STATEMENT D£ THE ISSUES 
PDINT I THE QUESTION OF TAX. COURT JURISDICTION 
CD Does UCA 59-24-1, which cereates the Tax Court 
Division of the District Courts, grant general 
jurisdiction, or only "exclusive Jurisdiction of 
all appeals from and petitions for review of 
decisions by the State Tax Commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the Commission", to 
the Tax Court? 
C2D When a District Court Judge sits as the 
District's "Tax Court Judge", is he limited to the 
jurisdictional scope of the "Tax Court" ? 
C3D Can the Tax Court, created by UCA 53-24-1, 
assume jurisdiction over a case before the State 
Tax Commission has conducted "formal hearings", 
and "rendered" any decisions pursuant to the 
evidence presented at said "formal hearings"? 
POINT II THE QUESTION DF SUMMONS AND SERUICE OF PROCESS 
C1D Is a "Petition for Writ of Mandate" a civil 
action which requires adherence to the rules of 
civil proceedure, particularly rule 4 concerning 
process? 
(2) Without proper service of process, haw does 
the Tax Court gain Jurisdiction over Appellant? 
C3D If rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Proceedure does not apply, how can Appellant 
object to the sufficiency of service of process? 
C4D Is the service of a "notice of hearing" 
sufficient as to replace the requirements for a 
service of summons ? 
POINT H i THE QUESTION 0£ JEOPARDY PURSUANT TO 53-31 UCA 
CI} Is Chapter 31 of Title S3 UCA descriptive of 
"jeopardy assessment procedure" or of some other 
procedure? 
C£) Is the "Writ of Mandate" proceeding, pursuant 
to UCA 53-31-7, an unusual kind of special 
proceeding in the form of "injunctive relief"? If 
so, then is "jeopardy" the special circumstances 
under which such an unusual proceeding is 
warranted? 
C35 Can the "Writ of Mandate", pursuant to 59-31-7 
UCA, be used where jeopardy neither exists nor is 
alledged? 
IHE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY OF EUIDENCE 
CI) Did the Respondent present sufficient evidence 
to support the allegations proffered in the 
"Uerified Petition For Writ of Mandate"? 
C£) Can evidence be "assumed", "presumed", 
"nonfactual", "hearsay", "probative", "not the 
origional", or based upon a "bogus report", or 
based upon a "notion" of the State Tax Commission, 
and be acceptable as proof of some allegation? 
C3) Is the appearance of the Appellant, that is 
his clothes and state of health, proof of his 
being a "taxpayer" and his having received 
"income"? 
C4D If Appellant is not a "taxpayer" or the 
receipt of "income", does he have a "legal duty"to 
file a tax return and can he be "mandated" to do 
so? 
Ill 
STATUTORY PROUISIONS 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED: 
Title 59, Chapter 24: Tax Court Act 
Section 1, Subsection 1: 
CDThere is created a tax division in each of the 
district courts of the State of Utah which shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions 
for review of decisions by the state tax commission 
rendered after formal hearings before the commission. 
Title 59, Chapter 31: Termination and Jeopardy Assessment 
Procedure 
Section 1, Subsection 1: 
CI) If the tax commission finds that a taxpauer intends 
quicklu to depart from this state or to remove his 
property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his 
property therein, or to do any other act (including in 
the case of a taxpayer selling or otherwise distributing 
all or part of its assets in liquidation or otherwise) 
tending to prejudice or to render wholly or partially 
ineffectual proceedings to collect any tax or penalty in 
lieu of tax for the current or preceding taxable period, 
unless such proceedings be brought without delay the tax 
commission may declare the taxable period for such 
taxpayer immediately terminated whether or not the time 
otherwise allowd by law for filing returns and paying 
the liability has expired. The tax commission shall 
immediately make a determination of tax for the current 
taxable period or for the preceding period, or both, and 
not withstanding any other provisions of law, the tax 
shall become immediately due and payable. The tax 
commission shall immediately assess the amount of the 
tax so determined Ctogether with all interest, 
penalties, additional amounts and additions to the tax 
provided by law) for the current taxable period or such 
preceding taxable period, or both, and shall give the 
notice of determination and assessment to the taxpayer, 
together uiith a demand for immediate payment of the tax. 
Section 7, Subsection 1: 
CI) If a taxpayer fails to file any return required 
pursuant to Title 59 uiithin 50 days of the time 
prescribed, the state tax commision may petition for a 
writ of mandate to compel the taxpayer to file the 
return. The petition may be filed, in the discretion of 
the tax commission, in the tax court of the third 
judicial district or in the district court for the 
county in which the taxpayer resides or has his 
principal place of business. In the case of a 
nonresident taxpayer the petition shall be filed in the 
third district court. 
The court shall grant a hearing on the petition for 
a writ of mandate within EO days after the filing of the 
petition or as soon thereafter as the court may 
determine, having regard for the rights of the parties 
and the necessity of a speedy determination of the 
petition. 
Upon a finding of failure to file a return within 
BO days of the time prescribed pursuant to Title 59, the 
court shall issue a writ of mandate requiring the 
taxpayer to file a return. The order of the court shall 
include an award of attorneys' fees, court costs, 
witness fees and all other casts in favor of the 
prevailing party. 
UTAH RULES OF CIUIL PROCEDURE 
RULE 1. GENERAL PRQUISIONS 
CA) Scope of rules: 
These rules shall govern the procedure in the 
Supreme Court, the district courts,city courts, and 
justice courts in the State of Utah, in all 
actions,suits and proceedings of a civil nature, whether 
cognizable at law or in equity, and in all statutory 
proceedings, except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be 
liberally construed to secure the Just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action. 
\Jt 
RULE 4. PROCESS 
Ca) Issuance of Summons. 
The summons may be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or his attorney. A summons shall be deemed to 
have issued when placed in the hands of a qualified 
person for the purpose of sevice. Separate summonses 
may be issued and served. 
CbD Time of Issuance and Service. 
If an action is commenced by the filing of a 
complaint, summons must issue thereon within three 
months from the date of such filing. The summons must 
be served within one year after the filing of the 
complaint or the action will be deemed dismissed, 
provided that in any action brought against two or more 
defendants in which personal service has been obtained 
upon one of them within the year, the other or others 
may be served or appear any time before trial. 
Cc) Contents of Summons. 
The summons shall contain the name of the court, 
the names or designations of the parties to the action, 
the county in which it is brought, be directed to the 
defendant, state the time within which the defendant is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall 
notify him that in case of his failure to do so, 
judgment by default will be rendered against him. If 
the summons be served without a copy of the complaint, 
or by publication, it shall briefly state the sum of 
money or other relief demanded, and in case of 
publication of summons such summons as published shall 
contain a description of the subject matter or res 
involved in the action. Where the summons is served 
without a complaint, it shall note therein that a copy 
of said complaint will be served upon or mailed to 
defendant within ten days after such service or that if 
the address of defendant is unknown, the complaint will 
be filed with the clerk of the court within ten days 
after such service. 
Rule 64A. PREJUDGEMENT WRITS 
C5) At the hearing on the issue of the writ or its 
continuance, the proponent of the writ shall have the 
burden of establishing the facts justifying its issuance 
and continuance. 
IU 
STATEMENT OF. THE. CASE 
NATURE Q£ THE CASE 
This is a civil case, based on the allegations that the 
Appellant is a taxpayer, that he tuas gainfully employed 
and/or earned commission income, that he earned and/or 
received sufficient "income" during the years 1973, 1980, 
1981, and 198E to be required to file federal income tax 
returns for those taxable years, that he was required to file 
Utah Individual Income Tax Returns for the above mentioned 
taxable years, and that he "failed" to file said returns. 
Upon these allegations the State Tax Commission (hereinafter 
referred to as STC) prayed the court to grant a Writ of 
Mandate pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. sec. 
59-31-7C1). 
Appellant denied each of the above mentioned 
allegations, challenged the jurisdiction of the tax court to 
hear this case, and challenged the applicability of Utah Code 
Ann. sec. 59-31-7C1) in these circumstances. 
Appellant's Brief - page £ 
COURSE DJF THE. PROCEEDINGS 
On Nay EQ, 1985 the Appellant was served with a UERIFIED 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. sec. 
59-31-7ClXRecord pp. E-5) in which the STC proffered the 
above mentioned allegations. On June 5, 1985 Appellant filed 
a UERIFIED STATEMENT OF REFUTATION, DECLARATION OF STATUS, 
AND UERIFIED STATEMENT OF FACTS,in which Appellant: declared 
that he is not a corporation, partnership, franchise, 
association, trust, employee, employer, or other person of 
priviledged status, but rather is simply a free and natural 
individual citizen who has no equity contract with the 
Federal Government nor the State of Utah by which specific 
performance can be compelled; denied each of the above 
mentioned allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of the 
Tax Court over this matter. 
At the initial hearing held June 7, 1985, Appellant 
orally challenged the jurisdiction of the Third District Tax 
Court and denied the allegations proffered by the STC. This 
placed the burden of proving the Jurisdiction of the Tax 
Court, and proving those allegations, upon the STC. They were 
unable to present any evidence, acceptable to the court, in 
support of their allegations, so the hearing was continued 
until July B, 1985 
Upon request of the STC for more time for discovery, the 
continued hearing scheduled for July B was rescheduled for 
August 13, 1985. Dn July 11, 1985, Appellant was served with 
a Subpoena Duces Tecum and a Notice of Taking Deposition and 
Request for Production of Documents. Said deposition was 
scheduled for July 19,19B5. Appellant responded with a Motion 
to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum, filed July IE, 1985 in which 
he argued that since the Jurisdiction of the court had been 
squarely challenged and a decision an that issue had not yet 
been made, there was no authority by which to issue a 
subpoena upon Appellant. A motion hearing on this issue was 
held on July E£, 19B5 after which the court took the matter 
under advisement (transcript p. 80 11. 4-7 8 16-17). 
On August 13, 1985, the scheduled continued hearing to 
take evidence in support of the STC's allegations was held. 
STC's principal objective in this hearing was to get 
Appellant on the witness stand and examine him under oath 
concerning his alledged income and assets Ctranscript p. 83 
11. 14-18}. Appellant attemped to raise another 
jurisdictional issue, but was summarily denied and ordered to 
come forward to be examined as a witness. After approximately 
14 questions were asked and answered, none of which generated 
sufficient evidence to support STC's allegations, the court 
intervened by declaring that it would issue the Writ of 
Mandate and compel Appellant to file tax returns Ctranscript 
p. 86 1. 16 through p. SB 1. 16). Court costs and Attorneys' 
fees were also awarded to STC. 
On August E3, 1985, the Appellant filed a Demand for 
Relief from Writ of Mandate and scheduled a hearing for 
September 9, 1985 to hear arguments on said Demand. 
Appellant's Demand raises the Jurisdictional issue that He 
was not allowed to raise in hearing on August 13, namely that 
the court lacks jurisdiction because the Appellant was never 
served with a summons as required by Rule Ht of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Proceedure. STC argues that this Demand is 
essentially a rehash of Jurisdictional issues already denyed 
by the court and should therefore be denied. Pursuant to the 
Memorandum Opinion and Order signed September 19, 1985, 
Appellants demand for relief from the Writ of Mandate was 
denied, but relief from costs and attorny fees was granted. 
The Appellant now brings this appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah from the final order of the Third 
District Tax Court Crecord pp. 145-147). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Appellant's status is that of a simple individual, as in 
free from complications and combinations, a free and natural 
person. Crecord pp. 15&16) 
S. Appellant is not the recipient of any special grant from 
the State; that is, he is not a privileged person such as a 
firm, partnership, association, corporation, franchise, ect. 
Crecord pp. 15&16) 
3. On the 9th of May, 1SB5, this action was commenced when 
the State Tax Commission filed a "Uerified Petition for Writ 
of Mandate", a "Uerification", and a "Notice of Hearing" in 
the Tax Court of the 3rd Judicial District. Crecord pp. £-63 
4. Said Petition was an origional action, not being 
supplemental to any other proceedings. Crecord} 
5. On the EOth day of flay, 19B5, an employee of the State 
Tax Commission served a copy of said "Uerified Petition for 
Writ of Mandate", a "Uerification", and a "Notice of Hearing" 
on Appellant's wife. Crecord p. B) 
6. The determinations upon which STC based their 
allegations were made by one tlericia L. Fryer. Ctranscript p. 
15 11. 1~11) 
7. The sole basis for said determinations was a document 
purported to be a copy of a Federal nonfiling audit. 
Ctranscript p. 15 11. 13&14, p. 17 11. 3-10, p. 13 11. 4-1E) 
8. This is the first Writ of Mandate the STC has petitioned 
for, based on a "federal nonfiling audit". Ctranscript p. 13 
11. 4&5) 
3. The document purported to be a copy of the federal 
nonfiling audit was marked as exhibit #1 and offered for 
acceptance as evidence. Ctranscript p. 15 1. E5, p. 15 11. 
1-5, p. 17 11. 3-13) 
10. Said exhibit #1 was never accepted as evidence, but was 
ruled as hearsay. Ctranscript p. IB 11. l&E, p. 13 11. E3--E5, 
p. E3 11. 18-E5, p. E5 11. 1-3, p. SB 11. 1B-E5) 
11. The Tax Court has stated that Ms. Fryer, in testimony, 
didn't establish any evidence concerning the allegations 
except that Appellant had not filed a Utah Individual Tax 
Return for the years in question, which appellant admits. 
Ctranscript p. 40 11. 10-13) 
IE. No summons, concerning this action, has issued nor been 
served upon Appellant. (record) 
13. The "Notice of Hearing", which was served with said 
Petition and Uerification, was not addressed to Appellant, 
did not state the county in which this action was being 
brought, and did not instruct Appellant what he should to 
avoid the entry of judgement by default, but only stated the 
time, place, and before whom the hearing was to occur. 
Crecord p. 7) 
14. At no time has Appellant filed an appeal to the Tax 
Court Division of the Third Judicial District, made any 
general appearances, general motions, or knowingly taken any 
other action which would indicate "voluntary" entrance into 
the jurisdiction of the Tax Court of the 3rd Judicial 
District, but has always been careful to let the record show 
the special nature of each appearance in order to preserve 
his challenge to the Tax Court's jurisdiction, (transcript p. 
4£ 11. 12-14, p. 73 11. 11-16, p. 97 11. 8-14, record p. IB) 
15. There were no "formal hearings", and no decision was 
rendered pursuant to such, concerning this matter from which 
an appeal could have been taken to the Tax Court, (transcript 
p. 43 1. 18) 
IB. This action was brought pursuant to the provisions of 
UCA 59-31-7C1).Crecord p. E) 
17. In instant case, jeopardy was neither alledged nor 
proven by STC. Ctranscript & record) 
IS. Appellant did challenge and object to the use of an 
"emergency jeopardy" procedure in the absence of emergency or 
jeopardy being alledged and proven. Crecord p. 5BS59D 
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SUMMARY D£ ARGUMENTS 
POINT 1 Appellant argues that the Tax Court of the Third 
Judicial District is excluded by statute CUCA 59-E4-l)from 
hearing instant case. 
POINT 11 Appellant argues that absent "voluntary submission" 
or service of summons Cas per rule #4 RCPD the Tax Court can 
not obtain jurisdiction over this person. 
POINT III Appellant argues that if the "Writ of Mandate", 
pursuant to 59-31-7C1D, is an unusual kind of special 
proceeding in the form of "injunctive relief" then it should 
be used only when the emergency situation of "jeopardy" 
warrants such. 
POINT IU Appellant argues that the State Tax Commission 
failed to carry its burden of establishing sufficient facts 
to justify the issuance of a Writ of Mandate as per Rule 
B4AC5D of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure. 
u 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I THE. QUESTION OF TAX. COURT JURISDICTION 
From the very beginning of this case, Appellant has 
challenged the Jurisdiction of the Tax Court of the Third 
Judicial District. In the first document filed by Appellant 
jurisdiction was challenged Crecord p. 24). At the first 
hearing appellant was hesitant to come past the bar, fearing 
that such an act would indicate a "voluntary" acceptance of 
the Tax Court's jurisdiction, thereby waiving the standing 
Jurisdictional challenge Ctranscript p.3 11.6-17). By U.S. 
Supreme Court declaration "once jurisdiction is challenged, 
it must be proven."CHagens v Lavine. HIS UDSD 533, note 3) 
—for mere "good Faith" assertions of power and authority 
have been abolished COwens v Indiana, 445 U.S. 6E2). 
The STC submitted the argument that the Tax Cout is a 
court of general Jurisdiction and that UCA 59-31-7 gives it 
jurisdiction to issue Writs of Mandate Crecord p.120) as 
proof of its contention that the Tax Court had jurisdiction 
over instant case. The Tax Court Judge assumed Jurisdiction, 
pursuant to this argument, and moved forward with the case. 
Applant's Brief - page 11 
Appellant argues that while the District Courts are 
indeed courts of general Jurisdiction created by the Utah 
Constitution, the Tax Court is not mentioned in the 
constitution but is a legislative creation, moreover, UCA 
53-31-7 is addressing the State Tax Commission as the subject 
to whom power is being granted. No grant of authority is 
given to the Tax Court of the Third Judicial District or the 
District Courts in this statute. Said courts are mentioned 
only as the objects of a phrase, not the subject of the 
statute. 
When the State Legislature authorized the Tax Court it 
did so by saying: 
There is created a tax division in each of the distrit 
courts of the State of Utah which shall have exclusive 
jurisdiction of all appeals from and petitions for 
review of decisions by the state tax commission rendered 
after formal hearings before the commission. C UCA 
53-34-1) 
By using the adjective "exclusive", the Legislature conveys 
their intent that this be a very narrow and specific 
Jurisdictional grant. Webster's New Twentieth Century 
Dictionary defines "exclusive" as: 
1. Excluding all others; shutting out other 
considerations, happenings, existences, occupations, 
etc.; as, vegetable and mineral are exclusive terms. 
2. Having the tendency or power to exclude all others 
3. Excluding all but what is specified; as, onlu is an 
exclusive particle. 
4. Not shared or divided; sole; single; as, an exclusive 
right to sell something. 
Therefore, by this definition, the Tax Court is only granted 
Jurisdiction within a very precise and specific range of 
circumstances. 
Three distinctly identifiable events must occur leading 
up to that Jurisdiction: 
1. There must have been a decision rendered by the State 
Tax Commission. 
£. That decision must have been rendered after formal 
hearings before the Commission. 
3. An appeal from or a petition for review of decisions 
so rendered must be brought to the Tax Court. 
If any of these indicia are missing then the issue does not 
fall within the "exclusive" jurisdiction of the Tax Court and 
must be taken elswhere. 
In a recent case concerning property taxation , the 
issue of the authority of the Tax Court Division of the 
District Courts was raised before this Supreme Court. The 
ruling in part read: 
The statutory scheme establishing the tax 
divisions...provides only that the tax division may 
review decisions, determinations, and orders of the Tax 
Commission, section 53-E4-3 CSupp. 1383), and may 
"affirm, reverse, modify or remand any order of the 
state tax commission, and shall grant other relief, 
invoke such other remedies, and issue such orders, in 
accordance with its decision, as shall be appropriate." 
Section 53-S4-4 CSupp. 1383). 
Kennecott v Salt Lake County., E3 UAR, p. 47 Caddendum 
#1) 
Since UCA 53-84-1 is the only Jurisdictional grant to a "Tax 
Court" in all of the Utah Code or the Utah Stat 
Applant's Brief pnye 13 
Cans L ~ L t .. - - ^ * t R t_ l ><-> *•' : I ^  saur^R r - -v— <--j i ct ian and 
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The record of instant case shows that although the STC 
did make some "determinations"Ctranscript p.15 11.4-113, said 
decisions were not rendered after formal hearings because 
there were no formal hearing (transcript p.48 11.5-E5 &p. 49 
11.1-193 and no appeal or petition for review has been 
recorded with the Tax Court on these issues by this 
appellant. This case therefore does not fall within the 
exclusive Jurisdiction of the Tax Court and cannot be 
determined by it. 
POINT II THE. QUESTION OF SUfiriONS AND. SERUICE OF PROCESS 
Rule 1 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure speaks of 
the scape of these Rules and says , in part: "these rules 
shall govern the proceedure... in. all actions, suits and 
proceedings of a civil nature... and in all special statutoru 
proceedings...". Rule 3 of said rules outlines the methods of 
commencing such actions, one of which is by the filing of a 
complaint with the court. Rule 4Cb) further explains that: 
"If an action is commensed by the filing of a complaint, 
summons must issue thereon within three months from the date 
of such filing...". Rule 4Cc) describes the contents of said 
"summons" to be as follows: 
The summons shall contain the name of the court, the 
names or designations of the parties to the action, the 
county in which it is brought, be directed to the 
defendent, state the time within which the defendent is 
required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall 
App1ant's Brief - page 15 
notify t .. • case of his Failure to do so, 
judgement: by default" will be? rendered aginst him 
Rule 4c. PnP^ 
i:\ 11 o f t: J i e f o r e g o i n g ri e scribes the n e c e s s a r y a n d 
Rst*ah ! i s?u^ rI |nr rJI;;;e1.1 ui • i.J 1 ,i j ml 11.1,, 11 «i i 1111ir I, {.jams J u n s u i c t i o n 
over a defendent/respundeni uh^ .n :here s - - '.;. "^ari, 
-. « U«L - The 
firs: i :.;-- ^iberbcard case ,r u/uch Supreme Court Justice 
Tuckett ho1 -* : 
-.t..^ Timnns dated April 1, 1PR9, was not in fact 
issued un: September £4. 1963, court failed to obtain 
; r-'sdiotian af defendent through such summons, and 
entry of default Judgement against defendants was • • 
improper. Kuies of Civil Procedure, rule 4(b). 
' 'r iberbaard v. Deitrich, 475 P2d 1005) (Addendum #E) 
As a Follouiup, six months 1 ater, 1) iis same Supreme Court 
clarified p'-- Fjrther that the service • 
i .:.... nn nypr » nerscn means Lhe pieciSb 
issuance and service of a s^ncis, as s:at»^ -n Ru^e 4 UL Lhe 
Utah Pules r^ r"-ii rro 
Set summons i;, L.U. a with tne mode 
pre •. .: by statute is , . w jurisdictional, fui 
is se:\.ce uf process, net actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action which confers jurisdic;,c-
Dtherwise, a defendant could never abject to the 
sufficiency of survice of process, since he must have 
knowledge of the suit to make such objection.. . W: proper 
issuance and service of summons is the means c; i-rxri".:; 
the Jurisdiction of the ccurt and of acquiring 
Jurisdiction over the defendant, th.-se cannot he 
supplanted by mere notice by letter * -• • -^ phone or any 
other such means. (Murdock v. p1 ~ ?d 1R41 
CAddendum #3) 
With the Court's memory refreshed concerning these 
cases, Appellant would like to focus attention on the 
circumstances of the case at hand, namely that: 
1. This case was commenced by the filing of a Petition for 
Writ of Mandate, which has been construed is a complaint, 
with the Tax Court Division of the Third Judicial District on 
May 3,1385. Crecord pp.2-5) 
2. Also filed with said Petition was a "Uerification" and a 
"Notice of Hearing". Crecord pp. 6&7) 
3. Said petition and attatched verification and notice of 
hearing were served upon Appellant's wife. Crecord p. 3) 
4. No summons has been issued nor served upon respondent in 
this case. Crecord) 
5. Said "Notice of Hearing" was not addressed to Appellant, 
did not state the county in which this action is being 
brought, and did not instruct Appellant what he should do to 
avoid the entry of Judgement by default, but simply stated 
the time, place, and before whom the hearing was to occur. 
Crecord p. 7) 
6. The three months time, allowed by RCP Rule 4Cb) in which 
a summons must issue, lapsed on or about August 3, 1335. 
7. Appellant has always been careful that all appearances 
and paper were of a "special" nature, challenging 
jurisdiction, and not of a "general" nature. Ctranscript p. 
42 11. 12-14, p. 73 11. 11-16, p. 37 11. 3-14, record p. 16) 
8. The Judge of the Tax Court Division of the Third 
Judicial District decided to issued the Writ of Mandate 
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a g i a n s t n;..* '- " ~ ;- '" •••• - r i n g t h e h e a r i n g ari A u g u s t 1 3 , 1 3 8 5 . 
C t r a n s c r i p -. 8b n , . fl-PVi 
\.r . ~ gf] in ] l i e mi las sei : <
 t ed 
"persons. . . ,,*.;,.- .?o u iu ..*<.-•... ud:. o general and 
lacking the re q u i r e m e n t s G U J I inert t;-.j :^  •• -• CRCP) that i i :i 
Sdrvj : '": 11: i s d :i c t :i aI i i; i i a s 
rp i ^ F i- t.;; e r a ay . n u p c a i d . i L u* ci^ -. I m p i u rn a ci e auj a r e c i i. rvc; 
petition through such servire ^ ^ — --. or^ -, ~« o- .-.recess, 
, . . .* . . ! '..- ' P W f a p 
g a * n e a j u n s a i c t i c r , . -, e r A p p e l l a n t and t h e r e f o r e was i m p r o p e i i 
j . i i x b S u ; o r t i i B w L i i u i M a n d a t e • 
T u i u J. ' " " • : "" t " : 
One. ..; , . .... .i i uc r .e , p u r s u a n t t o UCA 5 9 - 3 2 ~" ;• 
i n d e e d a j t a t u t a r . - ' -:*rv-*i Lve )- . •*• - o f ac "ir.^ ^ u 
. - a rm 
or i w t , -.. i. e n e : , ;. a: r a t i m p e l l e d 
t n "' : l e - *• < ' f t p n ~n c u je r *~*~" " K c r:^1" ' "• " * L UL~ i:.sff>7 V ~ 
t h e c o u r t e n t e r s i,*« d e f a u l t , a W r i t o f f l a n d a m u s . " ( q u o t a t i o n s 
r p -: r ? " * " • ' " - ^ ' T j r i n n t I n r c n s i , 1" nnc -* 103 
- t pa i i i t , and u p u n n i l ia t o a b i s a c e s r h r Ta -
C o u r t o b t a i " * ; u " . ^ d i c t i o n i t i t I s n o t v o l u n t e e r e d .. ^ e ^ e r a l 
a p p e a r a n d " i in mi 111 IF I I I I ' i mi | i n nr es'.j , t 
argues that soine f or n i ot s e L v HI (? of »•: cuuss i necessary : ::r 
the invoking of jt irj sdi ction even n cr~ir -vr 
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is indeed an "... unusual kind of proceedings..." Ctranscript 
p. 103 11. 15&16), then what are the unusual circumstances 
which warrent such "unusual proceedings"? Appellant argues 
that the circumstances which would Justify a court assuming 
Jurisdiction, absent full service of process, would be those 
under which the Legislature intended the Writ of Mandate 
Pursuant to UCA 59-31-7 to be used, namely leopardu. Thus we 
move into the next point. 
POINT IXI IHE QUESTION OF JEOPARDY PURSUANT TO 59-31 UCA 
To understand the jurisdictional grant afforded through 
59-31-7C1) UCA, we must first place this subsection in its 
proper context and then examine the exact wording and 
definition of those words. UCA Title 59 is designated Revenue 
and Taxation, meaning that all chapters, sections, and 
subsections, under Title 59 deal with revenue and taxation. 
UCA Title 59 Chapter 31 is designated Termination and 
leopardu assessments procedure, meaning that all sections and 
subsections under this chapter deal with termination and 
jeopardy assessment procedure of revenue and taxation. UCA 
59-31-7, being a subsection of Chapter 31, Title 59, can only 
be applied in cases of termination and jeopardy assessment 
proceedings of revenue and taxation, otherwise it is being 
applied outside the scope of its statutory application. 
Appellant's Brief - — - n° 
LJCA 59-31-1 describes tne grounds for" termination and 
% jeopardu assssn'-f * 
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quickly to depart from this state or to remove his 
property therefrom, or to conceal himself or his 
property therein, or to do any ether act tending to 
prejudice or to render wholly or partially ineffectual 
proceedings to collect any tax or penalty in li eu of tax 
for the current or preceding taxable per; :--d, i n iless such 
proceedings be brought without delay... 
It is east '. : h~ provisions of this chapter 
are unusual ki M'- rr v.^rr :ai emer . •" 
„L . . m a i l I ' -
 f_ , ifcr ^-ip) i.. »- i_r * , , 
c o l l e c t a t a .f t h e r e i s de la . , . hi *-. " f ^anda^p ^"' * lussd 
x\\ bubse:,r 
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LU s e e t h r wisdom of +-he 
L e g i s i a t u i L •** r a c i n g ; } . * «. :• of f landats «r I!E:
 W pa rdy a m 
a s s e s s m e n t p r o c e d u r e . 
ui'ic c a s e b e f o r e i ' , 3 
prebL _ - , no r even any au.L.jd; -.u)..^ . t . n u -i L,unu-: ion nr 
j e o p a r d y e x i s t s , Absent cirriu s i t u a t . i . 
p u r s u e one _ 
a t : _, ,„ ^ ^ , . uu£~t3^ .- , : s i enab le t o assume t h a t 
j u r i s , ! . : c r : i- - - hR ff=r 'wH r ? - - P r r n r - t e a r b i t r a r i l y 
p * I L ^ L . t i c n a t u r e and 
a p p l i e d - - . i r c L n s t a n c E i s , 
POINT IJJ THE QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY DF EUIDENCE 
The STC Petition for Writ of Mandate, which initiated 
instant case, avers basicly the following allegations 
concerning Appellant: 
1. Appellant was gainfully employed and/or earned 
commission income during the taxable years 1979-198E. 
£. Appellant earned and/or received sufficient income, 
during the above-mentioned years, to be required to file 
federal income tax returns for said years. 
3. Appellant was required to file utah individual income 
tax returns, form TC-40 or the appropriate alternative forms, 
for said years. 
4. Appellant has failed to file said forms for the 
above-mentioned years. 
Appellant in turn , by a document declaring to be a 
"special" appearance Crecord pp. 3&4), denied each of the 
allegations and challenged the jurisdiction of the Tax Court 
to hear this case. Again, at the first hearing held June 7, 
1985, Appellant orally denied each of the allegations 
proffered, and challenged the Jurisdiction of the court. This 
placed the burden of proving said allegations and 
Jurisdiction squarely upon the STC. In an attempt to shoulder 
H p p e n a n n ' s c r i e r - page d i 
this burder - present sufficierr e^-ir^c 3. . t. tness, one 
"* - I a: : 
Commission, was called. 
fis. Fryer testified that she had made tKs determinations 
which resulted r \ "\t-i above mentioned allegations -ir : Lhau 
document purpor Le*.j :. J, L-e; i-: ; ederal :-c* Pi._i~^ g audit" 
(transcr T'" S--1P"* T}-a1" dncument was mar''-sd and 
L.: L.-nt:; .LI, .. •_- accepter _ ^ cnurt* 
because STL c::;uic m?* overcome a "hearsay objection11 "::;, 
allegations or "h::; lurisdint ion of -\KP nurtr -!>-.-; i-- nresentsa or 
f^iea tax leiunib : •; ,.».,,( years Uianscnjji - "*":}. 
J\J- pvirierinp •- ^^L^P" 1 1 * T V ; U ^ cr'1','"^ • ~^ *urisdir+ ^  TI J UL 
;
:.J. ip". - . - . _ near i,_ 
conclus • c:- • * ;-r first hearing, thu :i:' Judge, refer: : ng 
*
 v
:p Appp] ' n* ' r~ * r ^ ^ KFIUUJ 
aeciaec yL.t unetner ^ ant . : isdictic,,.,, ; =i -1 
ua?J^:rbnr2cr ;p' (J 3r . , - - c.i:.:r; 1.. r..hereaf tar <;s 
J*-
establibi -.-sipe-ent evidence supporting un- i* b„ M^Btions 
(record ^. iQysxoe). 
During this first hear
 J.-- • i t became obvious Hunt MIM 
STC would be counting heavily an Appellant's own testimony to 
prove the allegations against him (transcript page 24 lines 
7-15, p. 27 11. 5-15, p. 46 11. 3-8, p. 56 11. 5-10). In a 
motion hearing, July 22,19B5, Appellant emphaticly stated his 
desire not to be a witness against himself: 
Let the record show that I, the respondent, do not 
intend to be a witness against myself. I demand my 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights at all times, and in 
no case will I willingly relinquish them. I intend to 
stand upon the Hale v Hinkle doctrine as expressed by 
the Supreme Court and I quote: "Ule are of the opinion 
that there is a clear distinction between an individual 
and a corporation, and that the latter has no right to 
refuse to submit its books and papers for an examination 
at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon 
his constitutional rights as a citizen, and he is 
entitled to carry an his private business in his own 
way. His powers to contract is unlimited. He owes no 
duty to the state or to his neighbors to divulge his 
business or to open his doors to an investigation so far 
as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no such duty 
to the state, since he receives nothing therefrom, 
beyond the protection of his life and property. His 
rights as such have existed^ by the law of the land long 
antecedent before the organization of the state, and can 
only be taken from him by due process of law and in 
accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a 
right to refuse to incriminate himself, and the 
protection of himself and his property from arrest and 
seizure except under warrent issued under law, and he 
owes nothing to the public as long as he does not 
trespass upon their rights." Ctranscript p. 77 1. 17 
through p. 78 1. 17, Hale v. Hinke, 201 u.s. 43) 
Despite Appellant's demands for his rights to privacy 
and against self incrimination, he was ordered, over his 
objection, to take the witness stand at the very beginning of 
the continued hearing on August 13, 1385 Ctranscript p. 8E5 1. 
20 through p. 85A 1. 5). After approximately fourteen 
Appel lant's Brief - page 23 
questions were asked and answered, none of u ihi ch generated 
J e g a t :i a i i s 11 i e c ::i i 11: t ::i 1 i t: e i: , e i i e d 
;.. declaring that it would issue the Ulc i t of Mandate and 
cornel ^ o n ° ; ]a r" " - • • f c- * " • ^  *-• •a 11 j r n s , C o t J r t costs a n d 
a 11: a .. i t o S I C C t r a T i s c i: i p t p 8 6 
;:  thrc:_:h n . *3r he reason given far -•;•.-:: 
issuance was LTIBL: I L ^ ;•:::: =?r: *' 
bought clothes and unu'r-
 id^::i,; ng L^ i c-asonably well, and 
LL'3 ' 11 simp ^ raqLirc ?:.r-e : r^lzum" (transcript. ,_ . L:_ -i-BD 
Appel lane argues that s m : e the sole document unc" -i^.ch 
sne r jt accepted, anc sincr: •* ether evidence that Appellant 
is a taxpayer and received income was accepted by L U B L ; • 
during the June / hejiing, and since nn additional evidence 
was gained through the questioning of *"z:pe 1 ..;nt : * t:he August 
i i 111 * I i I 11 
L IL. u S u u i i u w L_ . i, <+.. ~ . , i c i i i u r d t e p*_iL"Su.aii"L U C A 5 9 " " 3 1 " " 7 ! 
Rule 6HAC5) CRCP) states that; 
. -."w t! ie hearing on the issuai ice of tl le writ Ci ^ Ls 
continuance, the proponent For the writshall have une 
burden of establishing the Facts lustifuing its issuance 
and continuance, (rule 64A5, RTF') 
A p e r so i l' s appear a i i ce , t J i a t i s h is c1o 11 i e s a n d h is h e a11 ] i, 
simply is not pr oof oif being a taxpaue: J- : a*. : r.c received 
income and therebi i hs i I 1111 
UI 
CONCLUSION 
The statutes and rules as properly applied to the facts 
and circumstances of instant case, as outlined in this 
Appellant's Brief, prove that the Tax Court improperly 
assumed jurisdiction, and errored in the issuance of the Writ 
of mandate 
Wherefore, Appellant prays this Supreme Court to reverse 
the decision of the Tax Court, based on the arguments 
contained herein, and award Appellant costs and fees of this 
action. 
Dated this day of March, 19B6 
Clay K. Iverson 
Appellant in Proper Person 
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that exempi . - . taxation should be 
strictly con ufd Ail jurisdictions so 
hold. Howcv . wt have also pointed out 
that in so c tng we should give a reaso-
nable meaning to the language of the con-
stitutional ex. option and not construe it 
so narrowly that no institution can 
- qualify, thereby choking off the charitable 
enterprises the exemption was meant to 
encourage. Benevolent and Protective 
^-itr of Elks No. 85 v. 
Utah, 536 P. 2d 12 
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and drug addiction could be brttfT 
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I would uphold the constitutionality o 
sections ^59-2-30 and 59-2-31. The over 
whelming case law both from this Court 
and from other jurisdictions supports the 
legislature's determination. Certainly, the 
presumption of constitutionality of the 
statutes has not been overcome. I would 
affirm the decision of the Tax Commis-
sion granting an exemption to the two 
hospitals . I also concur i- *---f-c 
Stewart's dissenting opinion, 
Zimmerman, Justice, does not parti-
cipate herein; Sam, District Judge, sat. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, a New 
York corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
r. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, et aJ.f 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Ir 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, f! •! 
Cross-daimant s inf K p u <"!'" \ • 11 -
v. 
THE STATE TAX COMM1 SSION OF 
UTAH, et al„ 
Cross-defendants. 
No. 18972 
FILED: June 27, 19S5 
THIRD DISTRICT -
Hon. Philip R. Fishier 
ATTORNEYS: 
Theodore L. Ganno. 
John G. Avery for 
Keith E. Taylor, Jt 
Martineau, Bex K K».,dscn for Responde-
nts. 
omas Peters, 
do, Reed L. 
^ WART, Justice: 
s appeal arises from a :hai!engc 
Salt Lake County to the Utah State 
Commission's methods of valuing mi 
properties owned by Kennecott Corjx 
ion. On May 19, 1982, Kennecott sued 
Tax Commission, the County, and oi 
for a partial refund of its 1981 prop: 
taxes previously paid under protest. 1 
diction was alleged pursuant to U * 
1953, section 59-11-11. Kennecott c 
ained that U.C.A., 1953, section 59 ; 
(repealed 1982 Utah Laws ch. 66, sev'i 
6), which reduced, the valuation of re* • : 
ntial property by 20%, . was unconsti ,J 
onal and that consequently Kennecott's ,., 
burden was unlawfully increased. In K 
Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, U\*. 
F0t,UTAILC»0E ANNOTATIONS, m Ike wtoa-i KCIIOB cf rfclr *•«"? 
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681 P.2d 184 (1984)/- we upheld the cons-
titutionality of ejection 59-5-4.5, and by 
stipulation of the, parties that, issue is no 
longer part of this suittr 
The County o filed two taross-claims 
against the - Tax Xommission and one 
counterclaim against ' Kcnnecotfc*>-The first 
cross-claim againstvthe Tax* Commission 
alleged that U.C.A.* 1953, section 59-5-
57, which governs the assessment-of mines, 
mining claims, and mining machinery, 
prescribes a method of assessment that 
does not reflect the full cash value of 
mining property and therefore violates 
Article XIII, Section 3 of the Utah Con-
stitution. The cross-claim further alleged 
that the Tax Commission had failed to 
assess certain personal property of 
Kennecott at its full cash value and had 
erroneously assessed the value of improv-
ements to real property by classifying them 
as personal property. The cross-claim 
prayed for (1) a declaration that section 
59-5-57 was unconstitutional; and (2) an 
order directing the Tax Commission to 
correct the inequities in its assessment 
procedures and assess state-assessed 
mining properties at their full cash value, 
as required by Article XIII, Section 3. 
The second cross-claim against the Tax 
Commission alleged that the Tax Commi-
ssion possessed information of Kennecott's 
assessments that Salt Lake County was 
entitled to review and prayed for an 
order directing the Tax Commission to 
make the information available to the 
County. 
The County's counterclaim against 
Kennecott alleged that Kennecott's mining 
properties and equipment were under-
valued for various reasons1 and that 
therefore the County was entitled to 
recover lost taxes from Kennecott for 
previous years. It prayed for an order 
fixing the full cash value of Kennecott's 
properties as of 1981 and for a judgment 
for taxes that have escaped assessment 
over the past five years. 
The district court ruled that the County 
lacked standing to maintain its cross-
claims against the Tax Commission and its 
counterclaim against Kennecott and 
therefore dismissed the cross-claims and 
counterclaim with prejudice. The County 
appeals the dismissal. We reverse and 
remand. 
I. 
The major issue in this case is whether 
the County has standing to sue the Tax 
Commission and Kennecott. At the 
outset, we note that standing issues often 
turn on the facts of a case and that " fe-
deralizations about standing to sue are 
largely worthless as such/ Association of 
Data Processing Service Organizations, 
Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). 
Nevertheless, in Jenkins v. Swan, Utah, 
675 P.2d 1145 (1982), we formulated an 
alternative test for determining standing. 
1. We first apply traditional standing 
criteria, which require that (a) the 
interests of the parties be adverse, and 
(b) the parties seeking relief have a 
legally protectible interest in the controve-
rsy. Id. at 1148, 1150. "Plaintiff must be 
able to show that he has suffered some 
distinct and palpable injury that gives 
him a personal stake in the outcome of 
the legal dispute." Id. at 1148. 
2. If the plaintiff has no standing under 
the first step, then he may have standing 
if no one has a greater interest than he 
and if the issue is unlikely to be raised 
at all if the plaintiff is denied standing. 
Id. at 1150. 
3. In unique cases, standing may be est-
ablished by a showing that the issues 
raised by the plaintiff are of great public 
importance and ought to be judicially 
resolved. Id. at 1150-51. 
In this case, the County satisfies the 
first step of the standing test. Under the 
current statutory scheme, which was in 
effect when Kennecott filed its complaint, 
the Tax Commission assesses metalliferous 
mines and mining claims, section 59-5-57 
(Supp. 1983), and apportions these assess-
ments to the counties and the other taxing 
districts in which the mines and mining 
claims are situated, section 59-6-1(5) 
(Supp. 1983). By May 25th of each year, 
the Tax Commission transmits to each 
county auditor a statement showing the 
assessed value of the state-»assessed prop-
erties within the county and the amount 
apportioned to the county. Section 59-6-2 
(Supp. 1983). By June 1st, each county 
must in turn apportion the value of the 
state-assessed properties among the 
various taxing districts within the county 
and transmit statements of those apporti-
onments to the taxing districts. Section 59-
6-3 (Supp. 1983). By June 15th, each 
county must set the mill levy on the 
taxable property of the county. Section 
59-9-6.3 (Supp. 1983). The mill levies are 
limited to 16 mills per assessed dollar 
valuation in counties with a total assessed 
valuation of over $20 million and 18 
mills per assessed dollar valuation for 
counties with a total assessed valuation 
under $20 million. Section 59-9-6 2 
(1974). Counties may not incur debt in 
excess of the taxes for the current year 
except by a majority vote of qualified 
electors. Utah Const. Article XIV. Section 
CODE»CO 
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3, and in such case the debt is limited to 
2% of the taxable property within the 
county, Utah Const. Article XIV, Section 
4 
II, as alleged, koiiittoti'i* slate-assessed 
mining properties are under-assessed, then 
the County "suffers] some distinct and 
palpable injury that gives [it] a personal 
stake" in the assessed value of state-
assessed properties. The assessment determ-
ines in part the tax base of both the 
County and the taxing districts within the 
County, to whom the county treasurer 
owes a fiduciary duty. See Board of 
Education of Granite School District v. 
Salt Lake County, Utah, 659 P.2d 1030 
(1983). If the value of state-assessed pro-
perties is underassessed, the mill levy and 
debt limitations on the County could well 
prevent the County from raising adequate 
revenues to perform its statutorily establi-
shed responsibilities. 
This Court has heard and disposed of 
numerous cases where counties have chal-
lenged Tax Commission assessments, appo-
rtionments, and other actions by the Tax 
Commission. See Washington County v. 
State Tax Commission, 103 Utah 73, 133 
P.2d 564 (1943); Kane County Board of 
Equalization v. State Tax Commission, 88 
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418 (1935); Rich 
County v. Bailey, 47 Utah 378, 154 P 
773 (1916); Juab County v. Bailey, 44 
Utah 377f 140 P. 764 (1914); Salt Lake 
(bounty v. Srafe Board of Equalization, 
18 Utah 172, 55 P. 378 (1898). Although 
the standing issue was not explicitly 
raised in these cases, they implicitly 
recognize that counties have standing to 
challenge determinations by the Tax 
Commission that directly affect the 
counties' budgeting and taxing functions. 
Furthermore, the second step of the 
standing test would also give the county 
standing in this case. If counties do not 
have standing to challenge underassessm-
ents of state-assessed properties, then und-
erassessments could be effectively insulated 
from challenges, which would not likely 
be made by either a state-assessed 
property owner, by the Tax Commission 
(which made the underassessment), oi b\ 
any county-assessed taxpayer.2 
II 
'1 lir lax Commission nml Kennecott 
in pin that the County lacks standing 
lh in use no statute explicitly authorizes the 
County to challenge assessments by the 
Tax Commission. They advance a rule 
followed by other courts that the right of 
judicial review in tax assessment cases is 
h" statute limited to a specified class. 
and it cannot be - extended to entities, 
such as counties, not fairly within the 
statutory provisions a. ILg.,^'State ex rcl. 
St. Francois County School District R-III 
\. Lalumondicr, Mo.> =(518 S.W.2d 638 
(1975); In re Proposed ^Assessment of 
County Treasurer, >i2%9 jJawa. 1099, 260 
N.W. 538 (1935); Qdgsbyiw. Minnehaha 
County, 6 S.D. 492, 62' N.W. 105, 107 
(1895). See alsocz&nuot., 'Who May 
Complain of Underassessment or Nonass-
essment of Property for Taxation," 5 + A.-
L.R.2d 576 (1949). The rule advanced by 
the Tax Commission is consistent with 
this Court's decisions. See Pacific Intcrm-
ountain Express Co. v. State Tax Commi-
ssion, 7 Utah 2d 15, 316 P.2d 549 (1957); 
Home Fire Insurance Co ^ lynch 10 
Utah 189,56 P. 681 (1899). 
Nevertheless, the rule relied upon by the 
Tax Commission and Kennecott does not 
control this case, because it does not 
apply to cases wheie a county challenges 
not just the validity of a particular asses-
sment, but the constitutionality of the 
mining assessment statutes and assessment 
methods generally. Clearly, the decision 
of assessing authorities is subject to 
judicial review when they value property 
pursuant to a statute or method claimed 
to be unconstitutional, or have otherwise 
arted outside their statutory authority. 
I hen the overvaluation of property has 
arisen from the adoption of a rule of 
appraisement which conflicts with a cons-
titutional or statutory direction, and 
operates unequally not merely on a single 
individual but on a large class of individ-
uals or corporations, a party aggrieved 
may resort to a court of equity ... n 
Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 11 S 
535, 551 (1887); see also 3 T. Cooky, 
77ie Law of Taxation section 1201 (1924); 
84 C.J.S. Taxation section 561 at 1104-06 
(1954); cf. Home Fire Insurance Co v. 
Lynch, 19 Utah 189, 56 P. 681 (1899); 
Clay County v. Brown Lumber Co., Ark., 
119 S.W. 251, 253-54 (1909); White v. 
Board of Appeals of Cook County, 45 
111, 2d 378, 259 N.E.2d 51, 52-53 (1970); 
Meredith v. Elliott, 247 S.C. 338, 147 
S E.2d 244, 249 (1966). Questions of the 
legality or constitutionality of tax statutes 
are proper subjects for judicial review. 
See Utah Tax Commission v. Wright, 
Utah, 596 P.2d 634 (1979); Shea v. State 
Tax Commission, 101 Utah ?D9, 1?0 P ?d 
274(1941). 
In Kane County Board of Equalization 
v. State Tax Commission, 88 Utah 219, 
50 P.2d 418 (1935), Kane County petiti-
oned for a writ of certiorari to review Tax 
Commission decisions which set aside an 
assessment of an electric company's 
13^  UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
equipment by- Kane—County v The electric 
company argued^-that' the decision of the 
Tax Commission' was not reviewable 
because a, stature provided that Tax 
Commission decisions were1 final. We 
rejected that argument and issued the writ 
of certiorari, under the predecessor to our 
current Rule 653(b)(2), which provided 
for a writ of certiorari where an inferior 
tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction.* -
In this case, the County's first cross-
claim against the Tax Commission alleges 
that U.C.A., 1953, section 59-5-57, 
which assesses metalliferous mines and 
mining claims at a fiat rate of $10 per 
acre plus two times the net annual 
proceeds for the three preceding calendar 
years, is unconstitutional because it does 
not assess mining properties at their full 
cash value, in violation of Article XIII, 
Section 3 of the Utah Constitution. The 
cross-claim further alleges that the Tax 
Commission's methods for valuing Kenne-
cott's personal property also do not reflect 
its full cash value. Therefore, the County 
is entitled to seek judicial review of these 
issues. Similarly, the County's counterc-
laim alleges that several of the Tax Com-
mission's methods of valuation,see note 1, 
supra, result in a value substantially less 
than full cash value, and therefore the 
County is also entitled to judicial review 
of its counterclaim. 
Furthermore, the ca^ es cited by the Tax 
Commission and Kennecott to support 
their argument are distinguishable from 
this case on the basis of procedural 
posture. In this case, Kennecott itself 
complained that the 20fa reduction of 
county-assessed property values had unla-
wfully increased Kennecott's tax burden, 
and the County responded by a counterc-
laim and cross-claim challenging the 
valuation of Kennecott's properties. On 
general equitable principles, Kennecott is 
in no position to ask a court to adjudi-
cate the allegation that its taxes are too 
high and then claim that the court cannot 
adjudicate the allegation that the 
valuation of Kennecott's property is too 
low because of an allegedly unconstituti-
onal statute. By alleging underassessment 
of locally assessed properties, Kennecott 
put the valuation of its own state-
assessed properties at issue. -Rio Algom 
Corp. v. San Juan County, Utah, 681 
P.2d 184 (1984).3 Accordingly, Salt Lake 
County was entitled to raise the issue of 
the valuation of Kennecott's property. 
In contrast to this case, the cases cited 
by the Tax Commission and Kennecott 
are distinguishable because they involve 
direct challenges to or appeals from asse-
ssments, not counterclaims or cross-claims 
against a- state-assessed taxpayer of a sys-
tematic underassessment based on a consti-
tutionally challenged statute, especially 
when that taxpayer has directly challenged 
the valuation of county-assessed proper-
ties in an effort to reduce its own tax lia-
bility. 
The Tax Commission argues that the 
County cannot sue the State Tax Commi-
ssion or challenge the constitutionality of a 
state statute unless that power is specific-
ally enumerated in the County's grant of 
powers. However, we have held that 
section 17-4-3(1) grants the counties 
power to "sue and be sued/ where they 
may, under other applicable statutes or 
principles, properly sue or be sued. Shaw 
v. Salt Lake County, 119 Utah 50, 53, 
224 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1950). Part I, supra 
, demonstrates that applicable legal princi-
ples properly allow the tounty the right to 
sue under the facts of this case.4 
The Tax Commission also argues that 
the County's cross-claim was not timely 
filed. Its sole legal support, Juab County 
v. Bailey, 44 Utah 377, 140 P. 764 
(1914), is distinguishable because, again, 
it involves an initial challenge to a state 
assessment, not a counterclaim or cross-
claim. 
in. 
Kennecott argues that even if the 
County has standing to bring its counter-
claim, the tax division of the district court 
has no authority to .grant the County's 
prayer that the court value Kennecott's 
properties as of 1981. Kennecott argues 
that since the Tax Commission's power to 
assess mines originates in the Utah Cons-
titution Article XIII, Ssction 11, the Legi-
slature cannot diminish that power by 
allowing the courts to adjust mining asse-
ssments. 
We agree. Article XIII, Section 11, 
provides for creation of the Tax Commi-
ssion and provides that the Tax Commis-
sion shall "assess mines and public utiliti-
es.* In State ex reL Public Service Comm-
ission v. Southern Pacific Co., 95 Utah 
84, 79 P.2d 25 (1938), we held that 
Article XIII, Section 11, limits the Legisl-
ature's power to confer the power of asse-
ssment on any other governmental entity. 
In that case, we struck down a statutory 
scheme which effectively removed from 
the Tax Commission the function of 
assessing utilities and assigned that 
function to the Pubhc Service Commiss-
ion. We stated:' 
Constitutional provisions* must be 
considered as limitations on legisl-
ative power where there is language 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second section of tab k*ae. 
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of limitation or exception. ... The 
provisions of section 11 [of article 
XIII] specifically vest the power of 
assessing utilities in the State Tax 
Commission. Therefore, that 
specific provision must be consid-
ered as a limitation on the power 
of the legislature to place the 
assessing power in any other 
officer or commission. 
95 Utah 111-12, 75 P.2d at 38. Accord 
National Tunnel & Mines Co. v. Indust-
rial Commission, 99 Utah 39, 52, 102 
P.2d 508, 514 (1940). 
Accordingly, the Legislature is without 
power to confer the power of assessing 
mines, which includes fixing valuation of 
mining property, on the tax division of 
the- district courts. 'The statutory scheme 
establishing the tax divisions <4o&£#*foLt 
^wevei'r^iirporr'1^ 
only that the tax division may ^ review de-
cisions, determinations, and orders of the 
Tax Commission, section 59-24-3 (Supp. 
1983), an3 may 'affirm, reverse, modify" 
or remand any order of the state Tax" 
commission, and shall grant other relief, 
invoke such other remedies, and issue 
'such orders ... as shall be appropriate.^ 
Section 59-24-4 (Supp. 1983).n The reaso-
nable implication of these sections and, in 
view of Southern Pacific Co., supra, the 
only constitutionally permissible interpret-
ation, is that in challenges to mining asse-
ssments, if the tax division of a district 
court finds a Tax Commission order in 
error, the tax division of the court may 
only reverse and remand the matter to 
the Commission for a proper determina-
tion pursuant to correct legal standards. 
The County argues that a contrary result 
is mandated by subsections 59-24-3(1) & 
(2), which in certain cases provide for a 
trial de novo or an original proceeding in 
equity before the tax division. We 
disagree that the only reasonable interpre-
tation of this provision is that power is 
delegated to the tax division to revalue or 
reassess property, and in any event, 
Southern Pacific Co. precludes such a del-
egation of power. 
rv. 
Finally, the County argues that the 
district court erred in dismissing its 
second cross-claim, which prayed for an 
order directing the Tax Commission to 
make available to the County information 
concerning the valuation and assessment 
of Kennecott's properties. 
After the district court filed its memora-
ndum decision, the Legislature enacted 
"An Act Relating to Property Tax Asses-
sments; Requiring the Tax. Commission to 
Furnish Information Relating to the Asse-
ssment of State Assessed Properties ... to 
County Assessors.* 1983* Utah Laws ch. 
276. The act amends U.C.A., 1953, 
section 59-5-56, so. that...the information 
upon which the assessments and apportio-
nments of mines are calculated shall be 
available for review, by a county assessor 
upon request, and establishes penalties for 
unlawful disclosure of confidential infor-
mation. Since this case must be remanded 
for further proceedings and since the 
provision dealing with the disclosure of 
information is procedural in nature, it 
will govern the disposition of the 
County's demand. 
Reversed and remanded. No costs. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
Richard C. Howe, Justice 
Christine M. Durham, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
1. These reasons included (a) Kennecott's 
mining claims were valued at a flat rate 
per acre, irrespective of their fair cash 
value; (b) the assessment of Kennecott's 
minerals at two and one-half times the 
net annual proceeds with loss carry 
forward was an unconstitutional method 
of assessment that allowed much of Ken-
necott's minerals to escape assessment; and 
(c) the value of Kennecott's personal 
property and improvements to real 
property was underassessed because of 
inappropriate depreciation schedules and 
because historical cost less depreciation as 
a methodology of appraising personal 
property is in 'complete disregard* of 
currently recognized valuation practices in 
locally assessed personal property. 
2. This case does not present the issue 
of whether individual taxpayers may 
challenge the assessments of other indivi-
dual taxpayers. See generally Annot,, 
"Standing of One Taxpayer to Complain 
of Underassessment or Nonassessment of 
Property of Another for State and Local 
Taxation," 9 A.L.R.4th 428 (1981). 
However, even if individual taxpayers 
could, in certain cases, show a sufficient 
personal stake in another's state-assessed 
tax assessment, challenges by counties are 
a more orderly method in general for 
challenging underassessments of state-
assessed properties than individual taxpayer 
challenges. 
3. In Rio Algom, the parties * were 
situated similarly to this case: * Rio Algom 
sued San Juan County, complaining that 
county-assessed properties were underva-
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, see the second »ectio« of this l«*c. 
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lued because of two allegedly unconstituti-
onal statutory provisions, section. 59-5-4.5 
and section 59*5-109. - After upholding 
section 59-5-4.5- arid invalidating section 
59-5-109, we remanded the case with dir-
ections that to ptove its right- to recover, 
Rio Algom had r to establish (1) that the 
county-assessed properties were underapp-
raised, and (2) *the. true value of [Rio 
Algom'sJ own properties/ 681 P.2d at 
197. 
4. After the complaint was filed in this 
case, the Legislature enacted a procedure 
for counties to pursue in seeking judicial 
review of Tax Commission assessments. 
Sec U.C.A., 1953, section 59-7-12 (as 
amended, 1983 Utah Laws ch. 278, 
section 1) and section 59-24-2 (as 
amended, 1983 Utah Laws ch. 278, 
section 2). This case does not raise the 
issue whether a county which now seeks 
judicial review of a statute governing ass-
essment of state-assessed properties or of 
an actual assessment by the State Tax 
Commission must first pursue in all cases 
the procedural remedies provided by these 
statures. See Rio Algom Corp. v. San 
Juan County, Utah, 681 P.2d 184 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
The STATE of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Ronald Lynn VILES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 20271 
FILED: July 2, 1985 
FOURTH DISTRICT 
Hon. David Sam 
ATTORNEYS: 
David L. Wilkinson for Plaintiff and Res-
pondent. 
Milton T. Harman for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant appeals from the judgment on 
a jury verdict convicting him of escape 
from the state prison, a second degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §76-
8-309(1) and §76-8-309(2)(b) (1978 ed.), 
and theft of a vehicle, a second degree 
felony in violation of U.C.A., 1953, §76-
6-404 and § 76-6-412(l)(a)(ii) (1978 ed.). 
For UTAH CODE ANNOTATIONS, 
We affirm. 
Defendant was a prisoner of the Utah 
State Prison housed at the Millarc 
County Jail for work release from thai 
facility when he escaped in a stolet 
vehicle. He was recaptured and returnee 
to the county jail on April 22, 1984, 
Throughout the following month hit 
attorney filed a notice of appearance 
made request for discovery, and filed 
motions to reduce charge and sevei 
counts. On May 30, 1984, defendant 
delivered his "notice and request for dis-
position of pending charges* to the Utah 
State Prison. On June 30, he filed his 
motion to dismiss the action for failure 
to prosecute in a timely manner. Th< 
motion v as denied. Trial was held or 
September 20. 
The single issue before this court h 
based upon defendant's claim that he wai 
denied his constitutional right to a speed) 
trial. Defendant maintains that the notice 
of appearance filed on April 24, 1984 
constituted notice provided for in sectior 
77-29-1 of the Code of Crimina 
Procedure and that his trial was not helc 
until 150 days from the filing of thai 
notice. 
U.C.A., 1953, §77-29-1 (1978 ed. 
reads: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving 
a term of imprisonment in the 
state prison, jail or other penal or 
correctional institution of this 
state, and there is pending against 
the prisoner in this state any 
untried indictment or information, 
and the prisoner shall deliver to 
the warden, sheriff or custodial 
officer in authority, or any appro-
priate agent of the same, a written 
demand specifying the nature of 
the charge and the court wherein 
it is pending and requesting dispo-
sition of the pending charge, he 
shall be entitled to have the 
charge brought to trial within 120 
days of the date of delivery of 
written notice. 
The purpose of the statute is to protec 
the constitutional right of prisoners to J 
speedy trial and to compel law enforce-
ment authorities to promptly prosecute 
charges against prisoners. State v. Velasq-
uez, Utah, 641 P.2d 115 (1982); State v. 
Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d 158 
(1969) (stating the same purpose under 
former statute). This statutory scheme 
represents a legislative expression of the 
time limits that constitute at speedy public 
trial under the Utah Constitution. State 
see the second sectioa of tbis issue. 
/j dde,*d LA.WX if 1 
FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS 
Cite as 
25 Utah 2d 65 
FIBREBOARD PAPER PRODUCTS COR-
PORATION, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Ronald W. D IETRICH and Mrs. Ronald W 
Dietrich, Defendants, 
v. 
GREYHOUND BUS LINES, Garnishee 
and Respondent. 
No. 11961. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 28, 1970. 
f Action for merchandise sold to de-
enftants. The I h j j d ^ I ^ t n c l ^ C p u r t x Salt 
^ike County, Merrill C. Faux, J., granted 
garnishee's motion to quash writ of gar-
lishment and set aside default judgment 
entered against defendants, and plaintiff 
ippealed. The Supreme Court, Tuckett, 
[., held that where summons dated April 
[,.1969, was not in fact issued until Sep-
:ember 24, 1969, court failed to obtain 
jurisdiction of. defendants through such 
summonsjfand entry of default judgment 
igainst defendants was improper. 
Affirmed. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Judgment C=sl7(9) 
Process C^2l 
Where summons dated April I, 1969, 
was not in fact issued until September 24, 
1969, court failed to obtain jurisdiction 
of defendants through such summons, and 
entry of default judgment against defend-
ants was improper. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 4(b). 
2. Appearance <S=>8(3) 
Judgment <^99, 106(1) 
Letter which defendant wrote to plain-
tiff's counsel, with copy addressed to coun-
ty clerk, and in which defendant denied 
owing bill sued \ipon and stated that if any 
further proceedings were had, defendant's 
attorney would handle matter did not con-
OORPORATION v. DIETRICH Utah 1 0 0 5 
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judgment against defendant was error, 
where summons served on defendant had 
not been timely issued. 
3. Garnishment <£»I24 
Garnishee, to avoid risk of having to 
pay twice, had right to attack default judg-
ment entered against defendant to whom 
garnishee was indebted. 
Horace J. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
James L. Wilde, Ray, Quinney & 
Nebeker, Salt Lake City, for Greyhound 
Bus Lines, garnishee and respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff commenced this action to 
recover for goods, wares and merchandise 
it claims were purchased by the defend-
ants. The complaint was filed on February 
21, 1969, and the plaintiff procured the 
issuance of a writ of garnishment on the 
same day. At the time of filing the com-
plaint the defendants were residents of the 
State of California. A summons which 
was dated April 1, 1969, was forwarded 
to the sheriff of San Mateo County, Cali-
fornia, for service upon the defendants. 
.The summons was received by the sheriff 
on September 22, 1969, and was served on 
September 24, 1969, upon the defendant 
Ronald W. Dietrich. 
Prior to the service of the summons upon 
the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich a copy 
of the summons together with a copy of 
the complaint was forwarded to Western 
Greyhound Lines, the defendant's employer. 
The defendant Ronald W. Dietrich on 
September 30, 1969, wrote a letter to coun-
sel for the plaintiff with a copy addressed 
to the County Clerk of Salt Lake County, 
wherein he denied owing the bill sued upon, 
and also stated that if any further pro-
ceedings were had the defendant's attorney 
would handle the matter. A copy of the 
letter was filed by plaintiff's counsel on 
0 % 
r- % 
of the same constituted a general appear-
ance on behalf of said defendant. The 
garnishee had answered that it was in-
debted to the defendant in the sum of 
$248.96, which answer was dated on Feb-
ruary 28, 1969. 
[1-3] At the instance of the plaintiff 
a default judgment was entered against 
the defendants on October 27, 1969. 
Thereafter the plaintiff moved the court 
for the entry of judgment against the 
garnishee, which motion was noticed up 
for Rearing by the court. The garnishee 
appeared and moved the court to quash 
and set aside the writ of garnishment. The 
garnishee also moved to set aside the de-
fault judgment entered against the defend-
ants. By an order dated December 4, 1969, 
the court granted the motion of the gar-
nishee and quashed the writ of garnish-
ment and also set aside the default judg-
ment entered against the defendants. It is 
quite apparent from the examination of 
the file that the court failed to obtain 
jurisdiction over the defendants. While 
the summons was dated by plaintiff's coun-
sel on April 1, 1969, the same was not in 
fact issued for more than six months there-
after. Rule 4(a) , Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, provides that a summons shall 
be deemed to have issued when placed in 
the hands of a qualified person for the pur-
pose of service. It is quite apparent that 
the summons served upon the defendant 
Ronald W. Dietrich was not timely issued.1 
To avoid the risk of having to pay twice 
the garnishee had the right to attack the 
default judgment entered against the de-
fendants.2 The claim of the plaintiff that 
the defendant Ronald W. Dietrich made a 
general appearance by the filing of his 
letter above referred to is without merit. 
In any event, if it were to be construed as 
a general appearance the entry of judg-
ment by default was erroneous. 
We find no error in the decision of the 
court below, and the order of the court 
is affirmed. The garnishee-respondent is 
entitled to costs. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and CALLISTER 
aind HENRIOD, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent. This action was for the. <^ >\. 
lection of an account due for merchandise 
sold to the defendants. It was commenced 
by the filing of a complaint, and at the 
same time a writ of garnishment was 
served upon Greyhound Bus Lines, the 
employer of Ronald W. Dietrich. Suffi-
cient money was attached to pay the debt. 
The summons was not issued within three 
months following the filing of the com-
plaint as required by Rule 4(b), U.R.C.P. 
However, in my opinion Mr. Dietrich made 
a general appearance in this case on Feb-
ruary 27, 1969, when he filed a claim of 
exemption and motion to set aside the ex-
ecution of attachment of wages. Mrs. 
Ronald W. Dietrich never made an ap-
pearance in this matter, and so she is not 
before the court. 
The cases hold that an attack can be 
rnade upon the vaVidity oi a garnishment 
without making a general appearance, but 
the defendant here did not claim that the 
attachment was void. He acknowledged 
its validity and moved the court to release 
all of the funds upon the ground that his 
earnings were only $800 per month and his 
living expenses amounted to $845.40 per 
month. By asking for affirmative relief, 
he made a general appearance, and no sum-
mons was required to bring him before 
the court. The law is set forth in 5 Am. 
Jur.2d, Appearance § 21, as follows: 
A general appearance is ordinarily ef-
fected by the making of any motion 
* * * based wholly or in part on non-
jurisdictional grounds. * * * 
Later, a summons was served upon Mr. 
Dietrich containing the following required 
\&Tlg\i2lgfc*. 
You are hereby summoned and re-
quired to serve upon or mail to plaintiffs 
attorney an answer in writing to the 
I. Rule 4(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 2. 41 A.L.R.2d 1131. 
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complaint and file a copy of said answer 
with the clerk of the above-entitled court 
within 20 days after service of this sum-
mons upon you. If you fail to do so, 
judgment by default will be taken against 
you * * * 
Mr. Dietrich, following the directions in 
the summons, ser /ed a document upon 
plaintiff's attorney by mailing it to him and 
also mailed a copy to the District Court of 
Salt Lake County where the action was 
pending. It is reproduced herewith.1 As 
an answer it was somewhat informal but 
in my opinion satisfied the requirements of 
the law as to making a general appearance 
in the matter. Rule 4(b), supra, says that 
the summons is to be issued within three 
months. This does not necessarily mean 
that there cannot be further proceedings in 
the action. The defendant can breathe life 
into it by voluntarily making an appear-
ance therein. Even if the motion for re-
lease of funds had not brought the defend-
ant into court, in my opinion the filing of 
this document did. It was, therefore, error 
for the plaintiff to take a default judgment 
against the defendant since the answer was 
filed before the default of the defendant 
was entered. 
However, it is not the defendant who 
moved to set aside the proceedings in the 
court below, nor is it he who is defending 
the order made by the trial court; it is a 
stranger to the main action, to wit, the gar-
nishee. It claims standing to participate 
in this matter because it does not want to 
pay twice. The answer to that contention 
is that if the garnishee does not want to 
pay twice, it should pay the money into 
court and let the defendant and the plain-
tiff vie for the funds. 
The garnishee can have no interest in the 
case as it pertains to the issues between 
the parties thereto. 38 CJ .S . Garnishment 
§ 235. If it chose to ignore the garnish-
ment and pay the plaintiff, it must sue the 
plaintiff to recover that sum but cannot 
move the court for a judgment in favor of 
the defendant and against the plaintiff, 
I would dismiss this appeal and remand 
the case to the trial court for such further 
proceedings as may be just and proper. I 
would award costs to the appellant against 
the Greyhound Bus Lines. 
I. "Copy to District Court of Salt Lake County 
Horace J. Knowlton 
9-30-1969 Dear Sirs : 
This is in answer to complaint civil No. 184947. 
F i r s t : You claim that we are residents of Salt Lake County or have prop-
erty in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
Answer^We moved to Pacifies, Calif, on March 8, 1965 and have 
been residents of Calif, since and wre have never had property in 
Salt Lake County. 
Second: Mr. Knowlton, I once told you that this bill was not mine. And that 
the person responsible has used or signed my name, 'whichever the 
case.' 
Remarks : Last February, 1969, you had a wage attachment against me. I 
have suffered embrassment [sic], my job was jeopardized, and other 
personal effects. 
Xow: I had to hire an attorny [sic] to get my money that was held for this 
attachment. The same Civil Xo. 184947. 
Please let me know if you are going to pursue this matter, 'if s o / 
I will let my attorny [sic] handle it. My compensation for this 
matter may be expensive. 
4 c. c. Ronald W. Dietrich" 
£ 3 
164 Utah 484 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
These actions seem to be maintained up-
on the theory that directors are trustees 
for creditors, but generally these cases 
have some element of fraud and deceit 
involved therein. * * * 
See also cases cited in the annotation at 
50 A.L.R. .462. 
We think the trial court correctly held 
that the second amended complaint did not 
state a cause of action against the individ-
ual defendants, the judgment is affirmed 
with costs to the respondents. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT, 
HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
KEY NOMBtB SYSTEM 2> 
26 Utah 2d 22 
Peter B. MURDOCK and Anthony J. But-
kovieh, dba P & B Oil Company, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Richard L. BLAKE, dba Wendover Richfield; 
and Atlantic Richfield Company, a corpo-
ration, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 12195. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 8, 1971. 
Lessor, which had obtained quashal of 
service of summons on it in action based 
on "insufficient funds" checks given by op-
erator of leased gasoline service station 
and declaration that judgment against it 
was void moved for judgment on counter-
claim for value of property sold on execu-
tion. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Gordon R. Hall, J., granted motion 
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Callister, C. J., held that where re-
turn of officer making service upon station 
operator as agent of lessor, a foreign cor-
poration, which had qualified to do busi-
ness in Utah and had a designated process 
agent, did not indicate that service could 
not have been made upon designated proc-
ess agent nor show that station operator 
came within statutory class of persons au-
thorized to receive service of process for 
lessor, default judgment against lessor was 
void. 
Affirmed, except for award of attor-
neys* fees. 
1. Process <§»4 
Service of summons in conformance 
with mode prescribed by statute is jurisdic-
tional, for it is the service of process, not 
actual knowledge of commencement of ac-
tion, which confers jurisdiction. 
2. Process <§=*4 
Proper issuance and service of sum-
mons is means of invoking jurisdiction of 
court and of acquiring jurisdiction over 
defendant and such cannot be supplanted 
by mere notice by letter, telephone or any 
other such means. 
3. Corporations <£»668(4) 
Judgment <£=>141 
Where service was not made on for-
eign corporation's designated process agent 
as provided by law, even if corporation 
had actual knowledge of the action, court 
did not have jurisdiction over corporation 
which was entitled to have default judg-
ment entered against it vacated. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rules 4(e) (4), 41(b). 
4. Process <§=>74, 135 
Under rule providing system of classi-
fication whereby service is to be upon one 
group primarily with right to serve others 
as secondary mode, to justify service upon 
member of inferior class, it must be shown 
that service upon member of superior 
class cannot be had and if person served 
was member of secondary class, return 
must sufficiently show facts which warrant 
service upon him. Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, rule 4(e) (4). 
5. Judgment C=I7(9) 
Where return of officer making serv-
ice upon alleged agent of foreign corpora-
tion, which had qualified to do business in 
Utah and had a designated process agent, 
MURDOCK 
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did not indicate that service could not have 
been made upon designated process agent 
nor show that person served came within 
statutory class of persons authorized to re-
ceive service of process, default judgment 
against foreign corporation was void for 
lack of proper service, even though plain-
tiff^ counsel may have received misinfor-
mation from office of Secretary of State 
to effect that corporation was not qualified 
to do business in the state. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 4(e) (4). 
6. Judgment <§=>40l 
After judgment for plaintiff is vacat-
ed, plaintiff stands in position of trustee of 
defendant of the property obtained under 
the judgment and restitution may be 
sought in the same or an independent ac-
tion. 
7. Secured Transactions <§=sl6l 
In all security interests, debtor's inter-
est m collateral remains subject to claims 
of creditors who take appropriate action. 
U.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
8. Secured Transactions <§=o|38, 168 
Security agreement creates in favor of 
secured party a lien entitled to priority 
over rights of unsecured creditors, but col-
lateral may still be sold by execution credi-
tor subject to interest of the secured party. 
^.C.A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
9
- Secured Transactions <§=>228 
Most important remedy available to se-
CUred party is right to take possession of 
collateral following a debtor's default. U. 
^•A.1953, 70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 
^-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d). 
°" Secured Transactions <§»222, 237 
After default, debtor has lost his right 
Possession in property subject to securi-
v. BLAKE Utah 165 
P.2d 164 
70A-9-503; Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
8(d) . 
11. Secured Transactions <§=»228 
On default, secured party is entitled to 
possession as against a subsequent levying 
creditor, for levy cannot void secured par-
ty's right to repossession. U.C.A.1953, 
70A-1-101 et seq., 70A-9-311, 70A-9-503; 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 8(d) . 
12. Pleading <§=>I82 
Allegations in counterclaim not re-
sponded to are deemed admitted. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, rule 8(d) . 
13. Secured Transactions <§=>I70, 228 
Where, at time suppliers of gasoline 
service station obtained default judgment 
against operator of station on basis of op-
erator's giving supplier's checks returned 
marked "insufficient funds", operator had 
been in default to lessor oil company which 
had security interest in tools, equipment, 
inventory and proceeds therefrom, oil com-
pany was entitled to possession of collater-
al and to recover from suppliers its value 
at time of sheriff's sale rather than pro-
ceeds of the sale. U.C.A. 1953, 70A-9-306, 
70A-9-503. 
14. Secured Transactions <§=>I7I 
One who has possession or immediate 
right to possession, such as chattel mortga-
gee or conditional seller after default, may 
maintain action for conversion against one 
who has exercised unauthorized acts of do-
minion over property. 
15. Trover and Conversion <§=^ 46 
Ordinarily, where there has been a 
conversion, and property is not returned, 
measure of damages is value of property at 
time of the conversion. 
right 
lnterest and retains only contingent 
s in the surplus, if any, after sale. U. 
Parker M. Nielson, LaMar Duncan, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellants. 
Allen H. Tibbals, of Boyden, Tibbals & 
Staten, Salt Lake City, for defendants and 
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CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiffs commenced the initial phase of 
this case in March of 1969, when they filed 
an action against Richard Blake and At-
lantic Richfield Company, alleging that 
Blake was the agent and operator of a 
service station in Wendover, Utah, which 
was owned and leased by Atlantic. Plain-
tiffs then alleged that on three separate oc-
casions, Blake, in the course of his employ-
ment, purchased merchandise for which he 
gave checks to plaintiffs, which were re-
turned to plaintiffs and marked "Insuffi-
cient Funds/ ' Plaintiffs prayed for judg-
ment against the defendants for $2,551.98 
in their first cause of action, and for $2,-
652.89 in the second and third causes of 
action. 
Service of summons was made upon 
Blake by serving him personally, and serv-
ice upon Atlantic was made by delivering 
the summons and complaint to "Richard L. 
Blake, agent." On April 28, 1969, plain-
tiffs had a default judgment entered 
against both defendants. Plaintiffs subse-
quently brought a supplemental proceeding 
against Blake, and in May 1969, they en-
tered into a stipulation with Blake which 
provided a schedule of payments. Evident-
ly, Blake did not make the payments, and, 
thereafter, plaintiffs caused an undated ex-
ecution to be issued on the judgment. A 
sheriff's sale upon the personal property 
located in the service station was set for 
the 24th of September, 1969. Atlantic 
learned of this proposed sale and through 
its credit manager notified plaintiffs' attor-
ney that Atlantic claimed a security inter-
est in the property. Included with the let-
ter were copies of all the documents which 
indicated that Atlantic had a perfected se-
curity interest in all the tools and service 
station equipment and inventory, and pro-
ceeds therefrom. The security agreement 
had been executed November 14, 1968, to 
secure payment of a promissory note exe-
cuted by Blake on September 16, 1968, for 
the sum of $8,781.19. A financing state-
ment was filed in accordance with the Uni-
form Commercial Code in the office of the 
Secretary of State. Plaintiffs' attorney 
was admonished that legal action would be 
taken if the seizure and sale of the assets 
of the service station were consummated 
Nevertheless, the sale was held, at which 
time three parties paid cash in the sum of 
$1,290.03; and plaintiff, Butkovich, pur-
chased the remainder for $1,531.60, which 
was applied against the judgment. 
Subsequently, Atlantic filed a motion to 
vacate the judgment and to quash the serv-
ice of summons. Atlantic alleged that 
service of summons upon it, a foreign cor-
poration, had not been in accordance with 
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P. Atlantic pleaded that 
it was a Pennsylvania corporation, qualified 
to do business in Utah, and that at all 
times pertinent to this action it had on file 
with the Secretary of State a designated 
resident agent qualified to receive service 
of process, namely, the C. T. Corporation 
System at 175 South Main Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. The pleading stated that 
no process at any time was served upon 
this designated agent. Atlantic concluded 
that the service was defective and no juris-
diction wras acquired; and, therefore, the 
judgment should be set aside and the par-
ties restored to their prior status. Plain-
tiffs' response thereto asserted that Atlan-
tic was aware of the action, and that plain-
tiffs' counsel had inquired at the office of 
the Secretary of State and been informed 
that Atlantic was not qualified to do busi-
ness in the state of Utah, and, therefore, at 
the time of service of process, Blake was 
the only agent having control of the assets 
of the corporation within the state. 
A hearing was held, and the trial court 
entered an order quashing the service of 
summons on the ground Blake was not an 
agent of Atlantic within the meaning of 
Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P.; and therefore, 
service upon him was insufficient to bring 
Atlantic within the jurisdiction of the 
court. The judgment against Atlantic was 
declared void and vacated. 
Thereafter, defendant Atlantic filed a 
motion for restitution, wherein Atlantic al-
leged that its property, having a market 
/ ci 04? 88, was sold at the sheriffs 
]c Accompanying the motion was an af-
*daut oi Atlantic's regional credit mana-
11, .tcmizing the property and its value, 
pontiffs have never controverted this af-
fidavit. Subsequently, plaintiffs properly 
jrrvcd Atlantic and then responded to the 
motion for restitution by claiming that the 
usucs raised m the complaint would deter-
mrc the true ownership of the property 
claimed by Atlantic. The trial court en-
tered an order requiring plaintiffs to pay 
:nto court the sum of $4,942.88, the value 
of the property sold, to be held by the 
clerk, subject to the order of the court as 
to the ultimate disposition thereof, based 
upon a determination of the right thereto 
as between plaintiffs and Atlantic. De-
fendant Atlantic filed an answer, counter-
claim, and a cross-claim against Blake. 
Plaintiffs filed a reply to the counterclaim, 
and an appeal to this court, which was dis-
missed as premature; the case was re-
manded to the trial court. 
Plaintiffs took no further action to com-
ply with the order of the court; so Atlan-
tic filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 
•11(b), U.R.C.P., and for judgment on its 
counterclaim for the value of the property 
sold on execution under the void judgment. 
The trial court granted judgment in ac-
cordance with the motion; plaintiffs ap-
peal therefrom. 
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court 
erred m vacating the default judgment en-
tered against defendant Atlantic, because 
Atlantic had actual knowledge of the ac-
tl0n- Plaintiffs argue that although serv-
, ce
 was not made on Atlantic's designated 
P^cess agent, as provided by law, Atlantic 
as aware of the impending sheriff's sale 
a n d
 contacted plaintiffs' attorney prior to 
t h e
 date upon which it was held. 
Atlantic urges that strict compliance 
NSlth Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., is necessary 
acquire jurisdiction over the corporation 
'• Sternbeek v. Buck, 148 Cal.App.2d 829, 
S0? P.2d 970, 972 (1957) ; Tropic Build-
ers
- Ltd. v. Naval Ammunition Depot, 
48
 Haw. 306, 402 P.2d 440, 448 (1965). 
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and that service upon Blake was not in 
conformity therewith, and was, therefore, 
insufficient; the trial court properly 
quashed the service of summons and de-
clared the judgment against Atlantic void 
[1-3] Service of summons in conform-
ance with the mode prescribed by statute is 
deemed jurisdictional, for it is service oi 
process, not actual knowledge of the com-
mencement of the action, which confers ju-
risdiction. Otherwise, a defendant could 
never object to the sufficiency of service 
of process, since he must have knowledge 
of the suit to make such objection.1 The 
proper issuance and service of summons is 
the means of invoking the jurisdiction oi 
the court and of acquiring jurisdictior 
over the defendant; these cannot be sup-
planted by mere notice by letter, telephone 
*or any other such means.2 _ ^ --- ' 
Plaintiffs further assert that service 
upon Blake was sufficient under Rule 4(e) 
(4), U.R.C.P., to acquire jurisdiction over 
Atlantic because Blake was an agent who 
had the management and control over 
property to which Atlantic claims a right 
of possession. 
Rule 4(e), U.R.C.P , provides: 
Personal service within the state shall 
be as follows: 
(4) Upon any corporation, not herein 
otherwise provided for, * * * by de-
livering a copy thereof to an officer, a 
managing or general agent, or to any 
other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process 
and, if the agent is one authorized by 
statute to receive service and the statute 
so requires, by also mailing a copy to the 
defendant. If no such officer or agent 
can be found in the county in which the 
action is brought, then upon any such of-
ficer or agent, or any clerk, cashier, 
managing agent, chief clerk, or other 
2. Utah Sand & Gravel Products Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 409, 410, 402 
P.2d 703 (1965). 
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agent having the management, direction 
or control of any property of such cor-
poration, partnership or other unincorpo-
rated association within the state. If no 
such officer or agent can be found in 
the state, and the defendant has, or ad-
vertises or holds itself out as having, an 
officer or place of business in this state, 
or does business in this state, then upon 
the person doing such business or in 
charge of such office or place of busi-
ness. 
The evidence established that Atlantic 
had been qualified to do business in the 
state of Utah, that it was in good standing, 
and that it had a designated process agent. 
[4] Rule 4(e) (4), U.R.C.P., provides a 
system of classification whereby service ** 
to be upon one group primarily with a 
right to serve others as a secondary mode. 
In order to justify service upon a member 
of an inferior class under Rule 4(e) (4), 
U.R.C.P., it must be shown that service 
upon a member of the superior classes can-
not be had. If the person served wras a 
member of the secondary class, the return 
must sufficiently show the facts which 
warrant service on him.3 
[5] In the instant action, Atlantic's des-
ignated agent, C. T. Corporation, was a 
member of the primary class, and Blake, 
even under plaintiffs' theory, was a mem-
ber of an inferior class. Furthermore, the 
return of the officer making the service 
neither indicated that service could not be 
made upon some member in the superior 
class, nor did it show by proper description 
that the person served came within an in-
ferior class. The affidavit of plaintiffs' 
counsel during the proceeding to quash the 
service does not cure the defect; the fact 
that counsel may have received misinfor-
mation from the office of the Secretary of 
State does not dispense with compliance 
3. Reader v. District Court, 98 Utah 1. 94 
P.2tl 858 (1939) ; Boston Acme Mines 
Development Co. v. Clawson, 6Q Utah 
103, 123, 124, 127, 240 P. 165 (1925) ; 
Gibbons & Reed Co. v. Standard Accident 
Insurance Co., 191 F.Supp. 174, 170 
(USDCDUtah, 1960). 
with "Ru'ie 4(e) (4), \3."R.C.?., which is I0r. 
mulated in mandatory terms. The judg. 
ment against Atlantic was void for lack of 
proper service. 
Plaintiffs further contend that the trial 
court improperly granted an order for res-
titution, and, furthermore, plaintiffs should 
be compelled to restore only $2,821.63, the 
sum for which the property was sold at the 
sheriff's sale. Plaintiffs also challenge the 
court's award of attorneys' fees. 
[6] In Levy v. Drew,4 the court held 
that where a judgment has been vacated by 
a trial court, the defendant is entitled to 
restitution of all things taken from him un-
der the judgment. After the judgment is 
vacated, the plaintiff stands in the position 
of a trustee of defendant of the property 
obtained under the judgment. Restitution 
may be sought in the same or an independ-
ent action.5 
Atlantic was a secured party and Blake 
was a debtor under a security agreement, 
and the issues of the instant action must be 
determined in accordance with the Com-
mercial Code, Title 70A, U.C.A.1953, as 
amended 1965. 
70A-9-311, U.C.A.1953, as amendec 
1965, provides: 
The debtor's rights in collateral ma] 
be voluntarily or involuntarily trans 
ferred (by way of sale, creation of a se 
curity interest, attachment, levy, garnish 
ment or other judicial process) notwith 
standing a provision in the security 
agreement prohibiting any transfer o 
making the transfer constitute a default 
[7,8] The official comments to th< 
code indicate that the purpose of Sectioi 
9-311 is to provide without equivocatio: 
that in all security interests the debtor's in 
terest in the collateral remains subject t< 
claims of creditors who take appropriat 
4. 4 Cal.2d 456, 50 P.2d 435, 101 A.L.R. 
1144 (1935). 
5. Also see Todaro v. Gardner, 3 Utah 2d 
404, 409, 285 P.2d 839 (1955); 46 Am. 
Jur.2d, Judgments, § 788, p. 949. 
MURDOCK 
Cite as 484 
Utah 169 
i The security agreement creates in 
secured party a lien on the 
ed which is entitled to prior-
cr the rights of unsecured creditors, 
Uxor of the 
^ " docs not exempt the collateral from 
^ judicial sale. The collateral may 
^M be sold by an execution creditor sub-
^ to the interest of the secured party.7 
' Section 70A-9-311 must be construed in 
I tv. of Section 70A-9-503,8 which pro-
noV> 
Unless otherwise agreed a secured 
pat> has on default the right to take 
po^cssion of the collateral. In taking 
possession a secured party may proceed 
without judicial process if this can be 
done without breach of the peace or may 
proceed by action * * * 
[9-11] The most important remedy 
available to a secured party is the right to 
take possession of the collateral following 
a debtor's default.9 After default the debt-
or has lost his right of possession and sale 
and retains only a contingent right in the 
surplus, if any, after sale. On default, a 
secured party is entitled to possession as 
against a subsequent levying creditor, for a 
levy cannot void the secured party's right 
to repossession.10 
[12] In the instant action, Atlantic al-
,e£ed in its pleadings that the debtor, 
Blake, had been in default in payment of 
his promissory note; that no payment of 
an\ kind had been made on the obligation 
since April of 1969, and that by reason of 
his default, Atlantic was entitled to posses-
sion of the collateral described in the se-
6
 .
F l r s t
 National Bank of Glendale v. Sher-
iff of Milwaukee Countv, 34 Wis.2d 535, 
149 XW.2U 54S (1967). 
7
 ;^Jtec Lansing v. Friedman Sound, Inc., 
(Fla.App.1967) 204 So.2d 740. 
8
- Harrison Music Co. v. Drake, 43 Pa. 
D l s t . & Co.2<l 637 (1907). 
9
 *
varP Bros., Inc. v. West Ward Savings 
&
 Loan Assn. of Shamokin, Penn., (Penn. 
Sup.CU970) 271 A.2d 493. 
'0- Platte Valley Bank of North Bend v. 
krac], 185 Neb. 168, 174 N.W.2d 724 
(1970) ; William Iselin & Co. v. Burgess 
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curity agreement. These allegations were 
incorporated in Atlantic's counterclaim 
against plaintiffs, and, since plaintiffs did 
not respond thereto, they are deemed ad-
mitted under Rule 8(d), U.R.C.P. 
[13] Since Blake was in default at the 
time plaintiffs received the default judg-
ment, Atlantic was entitled to possession of 
the collateral at that time, both by virtue 
of the express provisions of the security 
agreement and by 70A-9-503. In other 
words, the right to possession and sale of 
the collateral passed from the debtor, 
Blake, to the secured party, Atlantic, at the 
time of default, and these are the rights to 
which Atlantic was entitled to be restored. 
[14] One who has possession or an im-
mediate right to possession, such as a chat-
tel mortgagee or conditional seller after 
default, may maintain an action for con-
version against one who has exercised un-
authorized acts of dominion over the prop-
erty of another in exclusion or denial of 
his rights or inconsistent therewith.11 The 
Restatement of the Law, Restitution, § 128, 
p. 156, provides: 
A person who has tortiously obtained, 
retained, used, or disposed of the chattels 
of another, is under a duty of restitution 
to the other.12 
[15] Ordinarily, where there has been 
a conversion, and the property is not re-
turned, the measure of damages is the val-
ue of the property at the time of the 
conversion.13 The affidavit, submitted by 
Atlantic as to the value of the property at 
the time of the sheriff's sale has not been 
& Leigh, Ltd., 52 Misc.2d 821, 276 N.Y.S. 
2d 659 (1967). 
11. First National Bank of Bay Shore v. 
Stamper, 93 N.J.Super. 150, 225 A.2d 
162 (1966). 
12. Also see § 131, Illustration 3, p. 544. 
13. Whittler v. Sharp, 43 Utah 419, 426, 
135 P. 112 (1913) ; Clarke Floor Ma-
chine Div. of Studebaker Corp. v. Gordon 
(Maryland 1970), 7 U.C.C.Reptr.Serv. 
363; Doenges-Glass, Inc. v. General Mo-
tors Acceptance Corp., (Colo.1970) 472 
P.2d 761. 
•*,»,»averted by plaintiffs; so Atlantic is en-
titled to that amount rather than the pro-
ceeds of the sale as urged by plaintiffs.14 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed, except for the award of attorneys' 
fees, which was predicated on a provision 
in the security agreement to which plain-
tiffs were not parties. Costs are awarded 
to defendant, Atlantic Richfield Company. 
TUCKETT, HENRIOD, ELLETT, and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
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JOHN DEERE COMPANY OF MOLINE, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Harold BEHLING and Jean Behlfng, co-
partners, etc., Defendants and 
No. 12205. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 19, 1971. 
Plaintiff brought suit to recover as as-
signee of note and security agreement by 
wfhich defendants had purchased farm ma-
chinery from assignor. The 7th District 
Court, Emery County, Henry Ruggeri, J., 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff, and 
defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, J., held that evidence that there 
was no claim in writing that some of pur-
chased farm equipment had failed to work 
until 23 months after transaction, a few 
days before first major installment pay-
ment was due, supported finding that as-
signee of note and security agreement was 
holder in due course and entitled to re-
cover against defendants. 
Affirmed except as to award of attor-
ney's fees. 
14. It should be emphasized that Atlantic 
was entitled to possession based on 
Blake's default; if Blake had not been 
1. Bills and Notes <S=497(I), 525 
Where execution of note and securiw " 
agreement by which defendants had p ^ 
chased farm machinery and assignment of 
them to plaintiff was admitted, it v,-^ ^ 
ma facie established that plaintiff ^ ' 
holder m due course and entitled to re-
cover and defendants had burden of prov 
ing that plaintiff was not holder in due 
course and other affirmative defenses. Ut 
CA.1953, 70A-3-307. 
2. Sales <S=288(I) 
Absent persuasive reason for avoiding 
waiver of defense clause, warnings in doc-
uments by which defendants had purchased 
farm machinery that defendants agreed 
that defenses or breaches of warranty 
could not be asserted against third persons 
would be given effect. U.C.A.1953, 70A-
9-206. 
3. Bills and Notes <&=>525 
Evidence that there was no claim in 
writing that some of purchased farm 
equipment had failed to work until 23 
months after transaction, a few days be-
fore first major installment payment was 
due, supported finding that assignee of 
note and security agreement was holder in 
due course and entitled to recover against 
defendants. U.C.A.1953, 70A-3-307. 
4. Secured Transactions <§=»226 
In suit to recover as assignee of note 
and security agreement, where there was 
no evidence in record upon which to base 
award of attorney's fees, plaintiff was not 
entitled to such award. 
Stanley V. Litizzette, Helper, E. J. 
Skeen, R. C. Skeen, of Skeen & Skeen, 
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appel-
lants. 
S. J. Sweetring, Price, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
in default, Atlantic would merely be 
entitled to assert its priority and right 
to the proceeds. § 70A-9-306, 
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